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INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA" or "Su-
perfund"),' was the ninety-sixth Congress' response to
growing public concern about the proliferation of toxic
waste pollution across the entire country. 2 This statu-
tory program for the cleanup of illegally dumped haz-
ardous wastes was hastily enacted by a lame duck Con-
* J.D. Candidate, 2000 Fordham University School of
Law. The author would like to thank his wife, Jayne Mur-
phy, and his daughter Nicole, for their constant support and
encouragement during the writing of this Note and all
through law school. This Note is dedicated to the author's
mother, Bridget Murphy, who is suffering from Alzheimer's
Disease. Without her guidance and inspiring courage, law
school and all the achievements of the author's life never
would have been possible. The author's asks that you please
give generously to the Alzheimer's Association to help find a
cure for this terrible disease.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
2. See Peter K. Johnson, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington:
1997 Superfund Amendments: Will it Solve the Liability Prob-
lem and How Will This Affect Massachusetts?, 31 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 1269, 1272-73 (1997).
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gress at the end of 1980.' Largely as a result of this ac-
celerated legislative activity, CERCLA suffers from many
flaws and has endured much criticism from the federal
courts as being an indecipherable statute.4 Even after
CERCLA was reformed under the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") of 1986,5 the
basic flaws remain.
Section 113 of CERCLA contains the Act's "timing of
review" provision.6 This provision codifies the procedure
necessary for a citizen to challenge an environmental
remedy proposed by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") under section 159 of CERCLA.' The
timing of review provision was an amendment to the
overall statute that was passed in 1986 as part of the
SARA Amendments. 8 The timing of review provision in
3. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Li-
ability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 1-2
(1982).
4. See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA's Mistakes, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1408-10 (1997).
5. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
6. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1994), section 113
contains the procedure for initiating civil proceedings under
CERCLA, in addition to the timing of review provision, with
additional exceptions to pre-enforcement review. See infra
Part I.C.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994).
8. The passage of SARA in 1986 added "$9 billion to a
massive new cleanup effort, [and] institut[ed] fundamental
reforms of the [cleanup] program such as the establishment
of national cleanup standards. The legislation provide[d], for
the first time, cleanup authority for leaking underground
gasoline storage tanks and a community right to know dis-
closure program." 131 CONG. REC. H9550 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1986) (statement of Rep. Roe). For a summary of SARA's
changes to CERCLA, see generally, Superfund II: A New Man-
date, 17 ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 2 (Feb. 13, 1987).
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the SARA Amendments reflects Congress' concern that
so-called potentially responsible parties ("PRPs")9 held
liable for cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste sites
would deliberately delay the cleanup process. Under
section 113(b) of CERCLA,10 federal district courts have
"exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies
arising" under the Act. However, SARA added section
113(h), which limits this jurisdiction, providing for a
general bar of pre-enforcement review by federal district
courts of any removal or remedial action implemented or
directed by the EPA." While there are exceptions to this
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). "Potentially respon-
sible parties" is a term of art in CERCLA referring to those
parties that may be required to clean up, or pay for the
cleanup, of a Superfund site. Those who face liability as
PRPs fall under the broad scope of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a),
which holds liable:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility (where
hazardous wastes were disposed of on the Superfund site
during their ownership or operation),(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such per-
son, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incin-
eration vessel owned or operated by another party or en-
tity and containing such hazardous substances, and(4) any person wlo accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facili-
ties, incineration vessels or sites selected by such per-
son, from which there is a release, or a threatened re-
.lease which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous -substance ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1994).
11. A "removal" action pursuant to CERCLA is a tempo-
rary, emergency action involving the cleanup or removal of
released hazardous substances from the environment. See
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 300.410- .415. A
"remedial" action pursuant to CERCLA is a permanent rem-
edy taken instead of, or in addition to, a removal action at a
Superfund site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1994); 40 C.F.R. §
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general bar against pre-enforcement review, none of the
listed exceptions in section 113(h), particularly subsec-
tion 113(h)(4), the citizen's suit exception, explicitly or
coherently provide the federal courts with subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over pre-enforcement claims in citizen
suits where irreparable harm to human health and the
environment is asserted.'2 A bar on pre-enforcement
review would seem counter-intuitive to the remedial
purpose of CERCLA in cases where it is alleged that the
EPA selected remedy to cleanup a Superfund site poses
a serious threat of irreparable harm to human health
and the environment.
This Note focuses on whether Congress should amend
CERCLA to provide for a limited form of pre-enforcement
review for EPA remedy selections in citizen's suits where
irreparable harm to human health and the environment
is alleged. Part I examines the circumstances under
which CERCLA was passed, and discusses why CERCLA
is poorly drafted. Furthermore, this Part identifies the
reasons for SARA's passage and explains the general
ban on pre-enforcement review. Part II examines the
legislative history of section 113(h) and subsection
113(h)(4) of CERCLA, as well as cases that have inter-
preted the pre-enforcement review provisions. This part
then examines the short-lived circuit split over whether
to allow pre-enforcement review in citizen's suits where
irreparable harm to health and the environment is as-
serted. Finally, Part III recommends that Congress
adopt a limited mechanism for pre-enforcement judicial
review of remedy selections when irreparable harm to
human health and the environment is alleged. More
specifically, this Part suggests that section 113(h) of
CERCLA be amended by either providing additional sec-
tions or clarifying the existing citizen's suit exception to
300.420. See also 42 U.S.C. 9613(h)(4) (1994) (providing that
no action can be brought against a removal action where a
remedial action is to be brought at the same site).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1994).
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the general bar on pre-enforcement review. A properly
tailored exception would directly address the situation
where a citizen or PRP alleges that the EPA's cleanup
plan for a site would cause irreparable harm to human
health and the environment.
I. THE HISTORY OF CERCLA
A. The Context of CERCLA's Passage
By enacting CERCLA in 1980, Congress intended to
provide a swift, comprehensive federal program for the
cleanup of abandoned hazardous waste sites through-
out the United States. 3 Previously, in 1976, Congress
had enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA") 14 a program designed to regulate the meth-
ods of disposal and the amount of hazardous waste be-
ing dumped at functional hazardous waste facilities.
RCRA was not enough and the number of abandoned
hazardous waste dumpsites was rapidly increasing."
CERCLA was created to identify sites, clean them up,
and hold those responsible for the contamination finan-
cially accountable. 16
13. See generally JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I LIPELES,
HAZARDOUS WASTE 180 (2nd ed. 1993).
14. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988)).
15. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HARRIS ET AL., HAZARDOUS
WASTE: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE 5 (1987). A study or-
dered by the EPA in 1974 estimated that 8.9 million metric
tons of hazardous waste was being produced by United
States industry per annum. See id. A further EPA commis-
sioned study in 1979 brought the estimated annual hazard-
ous waste output to approximately 33.8 million tons. See id.
By 1981, a subsequent study authorized by the EPA brought
the annual industrial hazardous waste output in the United
States close to 264 million metric tons. See d. at 6.
16. See Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of
CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower
59120001
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CERCLA was partly a response to the horrifying expe-
riences of the citizens of Love Canal, located in Niagara
Falls, New York in the late 1970's.17 William T. Love be-
gan construction of the Canal in the late 19th century,
though it was never completed.' 8 From the 1930's to the
1950's, the site was used as a chemical waste dump,
most notably by the Hooker Chemical Company, which
ran the site from 1942 to 1952.9 In 1953, Hooker sold
the property to the town of Niagara Falls for one dollar
after facing confiscation of the property by eminent do-
main.2' Afterwards, the town built a grammar school on
the site and sold the rest of the property to a real estate
developer who built homes on the remaining property.21
By 1976, the EPA and the New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation began to investigate
complaints of chemical waste seeping into the base-
ments of the homes built on the site.22 Simultaneously,
health officials noticed reports of abnormally high rates
of birth defects, cancer, miscarriages, and underweight
children from families living in the vicinity.23 Eventu-
ally, the school was closed, families were evacuated, and
Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
199, 202-03 (1996). There are "two overriding goals of
CERCLA: (1) to clean up hazardous waste sites promptly and
effectively; and (2) to ensure that those responsible for the
problem bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the
harmful conditions they created." Id.
17. See William David Bridgers, The Hazardous Waste
Wars: An Examination of the Origins and Major Battles to
Date, With Suggestions For Ending the Wars, 17 VT. L. REV.
821, 827 (1993).
18. See MARY D. WOROBEC & GIRARD ORDWAY, ToxIc
SUBSTANCES CONTROLS GUIDE 160-61 (3rd ed. 1989).
19. See id. at 160-61.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Bridgers, supra note 17, at 827.
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the entire area was condemned as uninhabitable.24
When widespread media coverage revealed the details of
this tragedy to the public, citizens demanded govern-
mental intervention at the federal and the local level to
immediately clean-up hazardous waste dumps to pre-
vent similar disasters in other areas of the country. In
addition, people demanded that the government seek
out those responsible for the contamination and hold
those individuals responsible for the consequences of
their actions.2 5
The 96th Congress knew that a federal program must
be created to deal with the hazardous waste crisis.26 By
late 1980, Congress had been presented with numerous
bills proposing federal programs to cleanup abandoned
hazardous waste sites.27 When the results of the 1980
general election were official, the Democratic Congress
acted swiftly, since the Republicans would soon hold the
majority in both houses.28 Its action came partly as a
response to the public's sense of urgency, and partly
because congressional Democrats were well aware that
their time as a majority in both houses of Congress was
limited. The result was the passage of CERCLA, a hast-
ily drafted version of an abandoned hazardous waste
site cleanup bill. 29 The Bill sailed through Congress so
quickly, under a suspension of the rules, that there was
24. See d.
25. See d.
26. See id.
27. See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), 126
CONG. REc. H9437-78 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980); H.R. 85,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) 126 CONG. REc. H9186-201
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980); and S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), 126 CONG. REc. S14938-48 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
28. See Grad, supra note 3, at 1.
29. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 ("RCRA") regulates the disposal of hazardous wastes.
See Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994)).
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little debate in either the House or Senate.3 0 Conse-
quently, there was no opportunity to iron out any pro-
cedural defects or potential conflicts with other laws.3
Congress enacted CERCLA in late 1980, and President
Carter promptly signed the Bill into law. 32 The ramifica-
tions of the conditions under which the Bill was passed
became evident over the ensuing decade, as the federal
courts were repeatedly called upon to interpret the mul-
tiple statutory absurdities and inconsistencies that
permeated the statute.33
CERCLA provides for considerable federal funding to
enable the EPA to begin cleanups at sites that most sig-
nificantly threaten the release of hazardous sub-
stances.34 Superfund is funded by the federal govern-
ment, and is subsidized by revenue from taxes imposed
on the chemical and petroleum industries, which are
substantially responsible for the hazardous waste dis-
posed of in the United States. 5 Superfund money is
first used by the EPA to cleanup sites36 'that have been
30. See Nagle, supra note 4, at n.3 1.
31. See id. See also 126 CONG. REc. 31969 (1980)
(statement of Rep. Broyhill) (stating that CERCLA "was hur-
riedly drafted without the use of legislative counsel and as a
result contains a large but unknown number of drafting er-
rors. In just one night of review, legislative counsel has
identified more than 45 technical errors alone.")
32. See Grad, supra note 3, at 1-2.
33. For a comprehensive discussion of CERCLA's draft-
ing and interpretive problems, see Nagle, supra note 4.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (a) (1) & (b)(1) (1994).
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994).
36. The EPA may chose to cleanup the site itself and
then seek reimbursement from PRPs, or seek a court order or
issue an administrative order to require the PRPs to clean up
the site themselves. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1994).
See also Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987)
(stating "[s]ince Superfund money is limited, Congress clearly
intended private parties to assume cleanup responsibility.").
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placed on the National Priority List ("NPL"), 37 as part of
the National Contingency Plan ("NCP").3 8 The NPL is a
list of hazardous waste sites that have been ranked by
the EPA and the States as the sites most urgently in
need of cleanup. 9 Once a hazardous waste site has
been added to the NPL, a Remedial Investigation and
Feasibility Study ("RI/FS") must begin within six
months. 40 The study is conducted by either the EPA, or
the owner or operator of the site, under the supervision
of the EPA.41 Once the RI/FS has been completed, the
EPA selects an appropriate remedial action plan ("RAP")
within the guidelines set forth in the NCP.42 The EPA
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1994).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1994) states:
based upon the criteria set forth in [the NCP], the Presi-
dent shall list as part of the plan national priorities
among the known releases or threatened releases
throughout the United States and shall revise the list no
less often than annually .... each State shall establish
and submit for consideration by the President priorities
for remedial action among known releases and potential
releases in that State based upon the criteria set forth in
[the NCP]. In assembling or revising the national list, the
President shall consider any priorities established by the
States....
Id.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4)(e) (1994), which states
"Injot later than 6 months after the inclusion of any facility
on the National Priorities List, the department, agency, or
instrumentality which owns or operates such facility shall, in
consultation accordance with the Administrator and appro-
priate State authorities, commence a remedial investigation
and feasibility study for such facility ......
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1994), which states:
... When the President determines that [a remedial or
removal] action will be done properly and promptly by the
owner or operator of the facility or vessel or by any other
responsible party, the President may allow such person
to carry out the action, conduct the remedial investiga-
tion, or conduct the feasibility study in accordance with
section 9622 [regarding settlements] of this title. ...
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1994). The NCP is found at
40 C.F.R. Pt. 300 (1983), which sets out the criteria and pro-
5952000]
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then issues a report.43 The EPA must give interested
parties an opportunity to comment on the proposal and
hold a public meeting at or near the site before the rec-
ord of decision ("ROD"), setting forth the final plan, is
reached."M  Once the EPA receives such comments, it
must respond in writing to any significant submissions
and also include any significant changes to the plan,
which are then published and made available to the
public.4 5 After the ROD is completed, the EPA imple-
ments the plan.
B. Passage of the 1986 SARA Amendments
Although CERCLA was effective to some extent, there
were many problems. 6 Congress was well aware that
cedures to be followed in comparing remedial plans and
choosing a response.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a)(1) (1994). The EPA must
"[p]ublish a notice and brief analysis of the proposed plan
and make such plan available to the public." Id.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a)(2) (1994). The EPA is re-
quired to "[p]rovide a reasonable opportunity for submission
of written and oral comments and an opportunity for a public
meeting at or near the facility at issue regarding the proposed
plan .... The President or the State shall keep a transcript
of the meeting and make such transcript available to the
public." Id.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(b) (1994). "Such final plan
shall be accompanied by a discussion of any significant
changes (and the reasons for such changes) in the proposed
plan and a response to each of the significant comments,
criticisms, and new data submitted in written or oral pres-
entations .... ." Id.
46. Problems with CERCLA at this time included im-
proper political conduct in the form of conflicts of interest by
EPA officials and high level officers of the Reagan admini-
stration. See Karen M. Hoffman, Clinton County Commis-
sioners v. EPA: Closing Off a Route to Pre-Enforcement Review,
66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1939, 1944-47 (1998). Additionally,
Congress had originally underestimated the number of aban-
doned hazardous waste sites throughout the country. The
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CERCLA needed to be overhauled, so six years after the
initial passage the statute underwent a major revision in
the form of the SARA amendments. 47 For years, PRPs
challenged the EPA regularly in federal district court in
an attempt to elude or delay any financial responsibility
regarding their participation in creating Superfund
sites.48 The federal courts responded to this trend by
consistently holding that due to the statute's remedial
purpose,49 any judicial review prior to the completion of
a given cleanup to the EPA's satisfaction was barred.'0
Congress agreed, and SARA's timing of review provision
was passed to compliment and certify what had become
common law in the federal courts concerning this is-
sue.
51
EPA had estimated that between 1,200 and 2,000 site posed
a serious risk to public health in 1980. See H. R. REP. No.
96-1016, at 17 (1980). By 1985, approximately 10,000 sites
required cleanup. See H. R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 54 (1988).
47. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA") of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
48. See Superfund Improvement Act of 1985: Hearings on
S. 51 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., A&P
Hearings S. 51, 56 (1985) (statement of F. Henry Habicht II,
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice: 'The
goal of a pre-enforcement challenge is ordinarily to prevent
implementation of the remedy that EPA has selected. Ac-
cordingly, to be effective, such challenges generally request
an injunction halting further remedial action pending litiga-
tion of the appropriateness of the remedy.... Indeed, as we
have seen in litigation .. .challenges to agency decisions on
environmental issues can take years to resolve.").
49. The remedial purpose canon of statutory construc-
tion states that remedial legislation should be liberally con-
strued in order to effectuate the beneficial purpose for which
it was enacted. For a discussion of the remedial purpose
canon as it has been applied by the lower federal courts to
CERCLA, see Watson, supra note 16.
50. See infra Part II.A.
51. See infra note 100.
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While CERCLA had not expressly banned pre-
enforcement review,52 courts dealing with the issue prior
to the SARA Amendments created a federal common law
precedent.53 The federal courts consistently held that it
was Congress' intent, given CERCLA's remedial purpose,
to bar pre-enforcement review of EPA remedial action at
Superfund sites.54 Making the best sense it could out of
52. See infra Part I.C. See also Aminoil, Inc. v. United
States EPA, 599 F. Supp. 69, 71 (C. D. Cal. 1984).
53. As several courts have noted, the scheme and pur-
poses of CERCLA would be disrupted by affording judicial
review of orders or response actions prior to commencement
of a government enforcement or cost recovery action. See,
e.g., Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 22 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1113 (D. N.J. January 21,
1985). These cases correctly interpret CERCLA with regard
to the unavailability of pre-enforcement review. See S. REP.
99-11 (1985) (statement of Sen. Stafford). See also 131
CONG. REC. S14895 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Thurmond) 'The preenforcement review provision
adopted by the conference is one of the most significant pro-
visions developed during the reauthorization process .... It
is my understanding that the provision confirms and builds
upon existing case law. In particular, the timing of review
section ensures that Government [sic] and private cleanup
resources will be directed toward mitigation, not litigation."
Id.
54. See Lone Pine Steering Committee v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 777 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d
Cir. 1985) ('The statutory approach to the problem of haz-
ardous waste is inconsistent with the delay that would ac-
company pre-enforcement review. Thus, although not ex-
plicitly stated in the statute, we find in [section] 9604 an im-
plicit disapproval of pre-enforcement judicial review."); Solid
State Circuits, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 812 F.2d 383, 386 n.1 (8th Cir. 1987) ("We agree
with the district court's decision that it lacked jurisdiction to
review the merits of an EPA cleanup order prior to an attempt
by the EPA to enforce it."); Wheaton Industries v. United
States EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1986) ("We [hold]
unequivocally that pre-enforcement review of EPA's remedial
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a poorly written statute, the federal courts applied the
remedial purpose canon of construction to CERCLA to
create a general ban on pre-enforcement review of EPA
remedial action. Additionally, Congress adopted several
exceptions to this general ban on pre-enforcement re-
view in SARA.
Congress had decided when passing SARA that due
process does not forbid delaying review of liability issues
until after cleanup is completed. 5 After balancing the
actions [is] contrary to the policies underlying CERCLA.
Thus, the district court correctly ruled that judicial review
was not available under section 104 of CERCLA at this
time."); Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 317 (2d
Cir. 1986) ("[The district court] properly held that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to consider a challenge on the
merits to an EPA order before the EPA had initiated an en-
forcement action."); Aminoil, Inc., v. United States EPA, 599
F. Supp. 69, 71 (C.D. Cal. 1984) ('Thus, to the extent that
pre-enforcement review of the merits of the administrative
order is sought, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the ar-
guments made by the plaintiffs."); J. V. Peters & Co. v. Ad-
ministrator, 767 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Pre-
enforcement review would lead to considerable delay in pro-
viding cleanups, would increase response costs, and would
discourage settlements and voluntary cleanups."; United
States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 505-06 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("Courts that have addressed the issue of a trial
court's jurisdiction to review the appropriateness of the EPA's
removal efforts have held that CERCLA does not authorize
pre-enforcement judicial review of the EPA's ROD.").
55. See S. REP. No. 99-11, at 58-59 (1985)
The [bill's] changes relating to judicial review [which were
essentially the same as those eventually passed] both
clarify and confirm the existing process. The amendment
also establishes new procedures for reimbursement of
certain response costs and provides opportunities for ju-
dicial review of administrative orders once the response
action required by the order is completed ... This provi-
sion will -oster compliance with orders and promote ex-
peditious cleanup, by allowing [PRPs] who agree to un-
dertake cleanup to preserve their arguments concerning
liability and the appropriateness of their response action.
... This amendment is not necessitated by any constitu-
tional infirmity of section 106, as enacted in 1980, which
20001 599
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potential harms to the environment in delaying clean-
ups against the potential harms to PRPs who bear the
financial burden before liability issues are determined,
lawmakers concluded that the priority must be placed
on cleaning up toxic waste sites as quickly as possible.56
After the cleanup is completed, PRPs may sue the gov-
ernment for costs incurred and be reimbursed by prov-
ing, by a preponderance of the evidence either that they
are not liable at all, 7 or that the cleanup plan was arbi-
trary and capricious. PRPs may also seek contribution
payments from other PRPs if they can show that such
entities were also responsible for dumping at the site
and were mistakenly left out of the EPA's ROD.5 9 Be-
cause of the immediate danger to the environment and
to public health posed by Superfund sites, and because
lawmakers were aware that PRPs had been preventing
the EPA from promptly cleaning up Superfund sites
through protracted litigation, Congress sought to protect
the Superfund and EPA cleanup efforts from delay re-
sulting from such dilatory tactics.6° A deluge of PRP
challenges since CERCLA had been implemented had
already affords adequate protection of [PRPs'] due proc-
ess rigts.
Id.
56. See id. "[We] expressly recognize that pre-
enforcement review would be a significant obstacle to the im-
plementation of response actions and the use of administra-
tive orders. Pre-enforcement review would lead to consider-
able-delay in providing cleanups, would increase response
costs, and would discourage settlements and voluntary
cleanups." Id. at 58.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(2)(C) (1994).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(2)(D) (1994).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994).
60. See supra note 54. See also Lone Pine Steering
Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1985); and
Wheaton Industries v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir.
1986).
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significantly delayed cleanups, 6' and these delays, Con-
gress feared, could result in potential irreparable harm
to the environment, threats to human health, and de-
pletion of the Superfund.62 By adopting SARA in 1986,
Congress elected to pursue a "clean up first, litigate
later" approach,63 and conveyed a clear disapproval for
legal challenges to uncompleted environmental clean-
ups, especially challenges brought by PRPs.6
Before the SARA Amendments, some courts, pointing
to policy reasons and good faith efforts to maintain the
overall purpose of CERCLA, attempted to read a pre-
enforcement review exception into the statute.65 After
SARA, however, the federal circuit courts uniformly read
CERCLA section 113(h) as to exclude any pre-
enforcement review by the federal courts of EPA selected
remedial action until the EPA completes such action or
sues PRPs to recover cleanup costs, regardless of the
potential consequences of holding such a rigid view.66
Congress recognized the obvious conflict. On the one
hand, the pre-enforcement ban served Congress' priority
of cleaning up the worst hazardous waste sites by for-
bidding dilatory litigation before cleanup. On the other
hand, Congress acknowledged the rigidity of the rule
and the need for at least a little flexibility. In an effort
to compromise, while drafting the time of review provi-
sions, Congress added the citizen suit exception. Un-
fortunately, as we shall see, this offered no real excep-
61. See supra note 54.
62. See id.
63. 132 CONG. REc. 28,409 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Stafford) (Congress sought to avoid "specious suits [that]
would slow cleanup and enable private parties to avoid or at
least delay paying their fair share of cleanup costs.").
64. See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Judicial Review of CERCLA
Cleanup Procedures: Striking A Balance To Prevent Irreparable
Harm, 20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 339, 346-47 (1996).
65. See discussion infra Part II.A.
66. See discussion infra Part III.
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tion at all. 7 The courts, therefore, have been left little
room by the statute itself to employ common sense re-
garding irreparable harm to human health and the envi-
ronment, which explains the uniformity (with notable
exceptions)' of pre-enforcement review interpretation
since SARA was enacted.
C. CERCLA's Timing of Review Provision
CERCLA's language is ambiguous as to when federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear a pre-enforcement ac-
tion. As found in section 113(b) of CERCLA, federal
courts are given original subject matter jurisdiction in
all actions arising under the statute.6 9 However, this
grant of jurisdiction to the federal court is tempered by
CERCLA's timing of review provision, which Congress
included in the SARA Amendments. Under CERCLA's
timing of review provision, section 113(h), there is a
general ban on pre-enforcement review. °
67. See infra Part II.
68. See infra Part II.B. 1.
69. CERCLA reads in part:
Except as provided in subsections (a) and (h) of this sec-
tion, the United States district courts shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this
chapter, without regard to the citizenship of the parties
or the amount in controversy.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1994).
70. The timing of review provision states:
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal
law other than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law
which is applicable or relevant and appropriate under
section 9621 of this title (relating to cleanup standards)
to review any challenges to removal or remedial action
selected under section-9604 of this title, or to review any
order issued under section 9606(a) of this title, in any
action except one of the following:(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover
response costs or damages or for contribution.(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section
9606(a) of this title or to recover a penalty for violation of
such order.(3) An action for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2)
of this title.
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However, section 113(h) identifies five exceptions to
the ban on pre-enforcement review. 71 These five excep-
tions to the bar on pre-enforcement review fall into three
narrow categories.7 2 The first category is for actions for
contribution determining liability for section 107 re-
sponse costs.73 The second category includes actions
brought by the United States under section 106 and
private parties seeking reimbursements for costs in-
curred during an ordered cleanup under section 106. 74
The last category is for certain citizens' suits.75 Gener-
ally, under section 113(h) of CERCLA, judicial review is
banned until either an action is commenced under Sec-
tions 106 or 107, or until the cleanup is finished.7 6
Despite the exception for allowing pre-enforcement re-
view of any citizen suit under 113(h)(4), alleging that a
removal or remedial action is 'in violation of any re-
quirement of this chapter,' the courts have offered very
little real guidance as to when such a challenge will be
permitted.7  The minimal force courts have generally
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to
citizens suits) alleging that the removal or remedial ac-
tion taken under section 9604 of this title or secured un-
der section 9606 of this title was in violation of any re-
quirement of this chapter. Such an action may not be
brought with regard to a removal where remedial action
is to be undertaken at the site.
(5) An action under section 9606 of this title in which the
United States has moved to compel a remedial action.
42 U.S.C. § 9613 (h) (1994).
71. Id.
72. See Michael P. Healy, The Effectiveness and Fair-
ness of Superfund's Judicial Review Preclusion Provision, 15
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 286 (1995-1996).
73. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (h)(1) (1994)).
74. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (h)(2)(3)&(5) (1994)).
75. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (h)(4) (1994)).
76. See id.
77. Despite United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.,
31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994), which-was overturned. See dis-
cussion infra Part II.B. The harsh effect of the lack of pre-
enforcement review may be offset somewhat by the fact that
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given to section 113(h)(4) has basically closed off any
ability that PRPs or other parties have to challenge EPA
Remedial Action Plans ("RAPs") that potentially cause
irreparable harm to human health and the environ-
ment."8
II. How PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW WORKS UNDER
CERCLA
A. SARA's Legislative History and Case Law
In essence, when the 99th Congress passed SARA, it
adopted the federal common law regarding the pre-
enforcement review ban, with several exceptions. Con-
gress provided an exception to the general ban on pre-
enforcement review in citizen's suits, under section
113(h)(4). 9 Section 113(h)(4) makes reference to section
9659 of CERCLA, which provides the framework within
CERCLA for citizen suits.8 Ironically, section 9659, for-
bids pre-enforcement review of citizen suits.
SARA provided the opportunity for citizens and states
to bring pre-enforcement nuisance suits under state
law, either in federal court through diversity jurisdiction
or in the state courts. Section 113(h) stipulates: "No
Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law
other than section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is
applicable or relevant and appropriate under section
9621 of this Title (relating to cleanup standards) to re-
view any challenges to removal or remedial action....,8"
On the eve of SARA's passage, Senators conflicted on
the meaning of section 113(h). Senator Thurmond
citizens and PRPs may, under CERCLA, participate publicly
in the selection of a remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1994).
78. See discussion infra Part II.B.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) (1994).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (h) (1994) (emphasis added).
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stated that federal district courts have exclusive juris-
diction over nuisance actions falling under the scope of
this section of CERCLA, regardless of whether it arises
under federal or state law.8 2 Senator Stafford, on the
other hand, stated that Senator Thurmond's interpreta-
tion of this section is unsupported by the original law.
Senator Stafford believed the new section, 113(h), had
no bearing on the rights of people to bring nuisance ac-
tions under state law.8 3 Thus, the circuit courts have
82. Senator Thurmond made the following remarks:
The reference in the introductory language of the timing
of review section to the genera jurisdictional provision
28 U.S.C. § 1332 is designed with the sole purpose of en-
suring that actions in State court under State law can
continue to be brought in Federal court if diversity juris-
diction exists. Actions within the scope of diversity ju-
risdiction may include, for example, a private nuisance
suit against a person in another State who is not other-
wise acting pursuant to an agreement with the Federal or
State government. Thus, this reference to 28 U.S.C. §
1332 does not create any additional rights or opportuni-
ties to obtain review of a Superfund response action.
Similarly, the reference to 'Federal court' is simply to
recognize existing section 113(b) of CERCLA, which pro-
vides that except for review of regulations, Federal dis-
trict courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all controver-
sies under CERCLA. Therefore, any controversy over a
response action selected by the President, whether it
arises under Federal law or State law, may be heard only
in Federal court, and only under the circumstances pro-
vided in this section.
131 CONG. REC. S14895 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Thurmond).
83. Senator Stafford stated:
New section 113(h) is not intended to affect in any way
the rights of persons to bring nuisance actions under
State raw with respect to releases or threatened releases
of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants.
Whether or not a challenge to a cleanup will lie under
nuisance law is determined by that body of law, not sec-
tion 113, because section 113 of CERCLA governs only
claims arising under the act. ...
Nowhere in -the original law, in the version of H.R. 2005
approved by the conferees or in the statement of manag-
ers is there support for the proposition that "any contro-
versy over a response action selected by the President,
whether it arises under Federal law or State law, may be
heard only in' Federal court and only under the circum-
stances provided" in section 113. Such a statement is
contrary to the express legislative language and the
statement of managers ....
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been given conflicting information as to the literal
meaning of this portion of section 113(h) in the legisla-
tive history. A majority of the circuits have disallowed
pre-enforcement challenges to actions that fall within
the scope of section 113(h) that are brought under bod-
ies of law other than CERCLA.84
Such a construction would also be inconsistent with the
provisions of CERCLA and SARA relating to preemption
of State laws and displacement of Federal laws .... The
bill approved by the committee of conference continues
and confirms (the) policy of nonpreemption.
131 CONG. REC. S15479 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Stafford).
84. See United States v. Colorado, 900 F.2d 1565 (10th
Cir. 1993) (holding that CERCLA's legislative history and the
'savings' and 'relationship to other laws' provisions mean that
section 113(h) does not prevent all suits intended to enforce
obligations created by environmental laws other than
CERCLA); but see Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that section 113(h) applied to plaintiffs Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act claim alleging that the EPA
should have prepared an environmental impact statement
before entering into a consent decree, and that challenges to
remedial plans brought under all laws, not just CERCLA,
were precluded by section 113(h)); Boarhead Corp. v. Erick-
son, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that an injunction
sought by plaintiff was precluded by section 113(h), even
though plaintiffs claimed that a remedial action plan could
damage Native American artifacts at the site under the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act of 1966). See also, Clinton
County Commissioners v. United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[We find that
the plain language and legislative history of § 9613 (h) (4)
compel the conclusion that Congress intended to prohibit
federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over
all citizen suits challenging incomplete EPA remedial actions
under CERCLA ..... ); Arrest The Incinerator Remediation,
Inc. v. OHM Remediation Services Corp., 5 F. Supp.2d 291
(M.D. Pa. 1998) (addressing a citizen's suit brought under a
state law nuisance claim, the court, relying on Clinton
County, held that "where a claim under state law would cre-
ate a direct conflict and present an obstacle to the comple-
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Courts have turned to SARA's legislative history re-
garding citizen's suits when presented with the question
of the availability of pre-enforcement reviewgin citizen
suits falling within the scope of CERCLA. The majority
of courts have been persuaded by the language of the
Joint Conference Committee Report regarding SARA,85
which states:
In the new section [9613(h)] of the [statute], the
phrase "removal or remedial action taken" is not in-
tended to preclude judicial review until the total re-
sponse action is finished if the response action pro-
ceeds in distinct and separate stages. Rather an ac-
tion under section [9659] would lie following com-
pletion of each distinct and separable phase of the
cleanup.... Any challenge under this provision to a
completed stage of a response action shall not inter-
fere with those stages of the response action which
have not been completed.8 6
Additionally, courts have prohibited any review of an
ongoing removal or remedial action because of the plain
language of section 113(h)(4) of CERCLA. Section
113(h)(4) uses the words "taken" and "secured" which
refer to actions that have already occurred."7 Reading
the exception in this fashion, a majority of courts have
held that pre-enforcement review of any continuing re-
moval or remedial action is prohibited by the statute,
despite the fact that this language appears within the
citizen's suit exception to pre-enforcement review.88
tion of a remediation plan selected under CERCLA, the state
claim is preempted").
85. See, e.g., Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v.
Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 832 (D.N.J. 1989).
86. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Confer-
ence, H. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 224, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317.
87. CERCLA § 113(h)(4) is codified as 42 U.S.C. §
9613(h)(4)..
88. See infra notes 89 and 93.
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Since the statute refers to actions in the past tense,
courts, in an effort to facilitate expeditious cleanups,
have hell that citizen suits challenging the EPA during
the pre-enforcement stage of an EPA remedial action are
banned, despite the exception provided for under SARA
in section 113(h)(4)).
Several examples of this "past tense" interpretation
can be seen in cases that were decided after the enact-
ment of SARA.8 9 In Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas
Department of Pollution Control & Ecology9° the plaintiff
challenged the EPA's failure to follow its own regulations
in the burning of dioxin. The Eighth Circuit reversed a
district court's injunction and restraining order against
the EPA's removal plan, which involved the incineration
of dioxin.9' The district court held that "the burning of
dioxin containing wastes violated EPA regulations, and
that a violation of regulations tips the scale heavily to-
ward a determination that potential irreparable harm to
plaintiffs outweighs the potential harm to the defen-
dants."92 However, on appeal, the Eighth Circuit found
that given the plain language in CERCLA section
113(h)(4), the EPA must be allowed to complete the re-
moval action before the court had subject matter juris-
diction over the dispute.93
Likewise, in Schalk v. Reilly,94 the Seventh Circuit re-
jected a challenge by plaintiffs. In this case the plaintiff
alleged that the EPA's RAP, entered into by consent de-
89. See North Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 930 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1991); Voluntary Pur-
chasing Groups v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989); Ala-
bama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (1 1th Cir. 1989);
Reynolds v. Lujan, 785 F. Supp. 152 (D.N.M. 1992); and City
of Eureka v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Mo.
1991).
90. 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993).
91. See id. at 1215.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1216-18.
94. 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990).
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cree, to incinerate polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") at
the site in question was illegal because it was in viola-
tion of the NCP. The court relied on the "obvious
meaning" of section 113(h)(4), "that when a remedy has
been selected, no challenge to the cleanup may occur
prior to the completion of the remedy."95 The court de-
nied pre-enforcement review of a removal action where a
remedial action "is to be undertaken," and closed off the
plaintiffs challenge to the proposed removal action, re-
gardless of the possible consequences.
96
Despite the case law, it seems that a total ban on pre-
enforcement review of citizen suits was not the intent of
lawmakers when they passed SARA. The legislative
history shows that members of Congress wanted to pro-
vide the pre-enforcement review exception to citizens
who brought action against the government, particularly
in cases where the plaintiff asserted that the EPA's re-
medial action plan poses a danger of irreparable harm
to human health or the environment. 97 Yet, it is far from
clear based on the language of SARA, under what cir-
cumstances Congress intended citizen's suits to be
heard before a final cleanup is completed.
B. The Gamma-Tech/ Clinton County Controversy
One exception to the concept of strict adherence to the
ban on pre-enforcement review of citizen suits existed in
the federal courts at the post-SARA stage. In Cabot
95. Id. at 1095.
96. See Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1095. While the decision to
reject the plaintiffs challenge to the removal action was
within the scope of CERCLA § 9613(h)(4) as the court under-
stood it, it is somewhat troubling that the court in this case
failed to address the possible health and environmental
ramifications of such a blanket rejection of challenges
brought to protect human health and the environment at the
removal stage.
97. See discussion infra, Part III.A.
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Corp. v. United States EPA98 the Court held that a chal-
lenge based on the lack of cost-effectiveness of the EPA's
plan was precluded by section 113(h) because monetary
damages could be adequately determined as part of a
cost recovery action.99 However, the Court, citing the
inconsistent legislative record regarding section
113(h)(4), commented that if irreparable harm to human
health and the environment were alleged, a court could
justifiably evaluate the EPA's RAP at the pre-
enforcement stage.' 0 While not having a direct effect on
the case at hand, the Cabot Court's reasoning did have
a far-reaching effect on subsequent cases.
1. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.
In 1994, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals allowed a
pre-enforcement review challenge brought under the
citizen's suit exception in CERCLA section 113(h)(4) in
United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.1 1 In this
case the government had found trichloroethylene
(' TCE") contamination in the groundwater at two sites
on property owned by Princeton Gamma-Tech. 0 2 The
sites were placed on the NPL, and in 1984, the EPA ar-
98. 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
99. See id. at 830.
100. See id. at 829-30.
101. 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994), overruled by Clinton
County Comm'rs v. United States EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d
Cir. 1997). There have been several scholarly works treating
the Gamma-Tech case and its ramifications. See, e.g., Paul
H. McConnell, Note: CERCLA Wrestling - Grappling With Con-
flicting Legislative Intent and the Citizen's Suit Provision -
United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir.
1994), 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 115 (1995); Lucia Ann
Silecchia, Judicial Review of Cleanup Procedures: Striking A
Balance To Prevent Irreparable Harm, 20 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv.
339 (1996); and Karen M. Hoffman, Note: Clinton County
Commissioners v. EPA: Closing Off A Route To Pre-
Enforcement Review, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1939 (1998).
102. See Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 140.
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ranged for an RI/FS at both locations.1 0 3 By 1987, the
EPA issued its first ROD, which called for the sealing of
private wells and the installation of an alternative water
supply at one site."' However, after further inspection
and investigation of the contamination, the EPA issued
a second ROD in 1988, which "proposed to extract the
contaminated water from the primary contamination
plume in the shallow aquifer, to treat it, and then rein-
ject it into the aquifer. In addition, the plan provided
for the installation of 'open-hole' wells that penetrate
through the shallow source to the deep aquifer to allow
for monitoring and sampling."
0 5
In 1991, the EPA brought a cost recovery action
against Gamma-Tech under CERCLA section 107 (a),
seeking reimbursement of expenditures already incurred
by the EPA in the monitoring of the sites and the partial
installation of the proposed wells, as well as an action
seeking a declaratory judgment on Gamma-Tech's li-
ability for future response costs.' 6 Gamma-Tech filed a
cross-motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to
compel the EPA to cease its remedial action plan, as-
serting that the EPA's plan to drill open-hole wells into
the deep layer of the aquifer as spelled out in the 1988
ROD would worsen the existing environmental damage
and cause irreparable harm to the environment. 0 7 The
District Court denied Gamma-Tech's request for injunc-
tive relief. The Court relied on "statutory and decisional
law" which stated that claims challenging the EPA's fi-
nal remedial action plan must be dismissed until after
the completion of a discrete phase of a cleanup. Hence,
the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
dispute. 08
103. See id.
104. See id. at 140-41.
105. Id. at 141.
106. See id.
107. See Gamma-Tech, 31 F. 3d at 141.
108. See id.
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that an in-
junction could be issued under the citizens suit excep-
tion when there is a possibility of irreparable harm to
health or the environment prior to the completion of the
cleanup.109 The Gamma-Tech Court's allowance of the
pre-enforcement review contradicted the majority of fed-
eral circuit courts, which interpreted the "plain lan-
guage" of section 113(h)(4). ° The result created a con-
troversy as to whether courts should read an exception
into the citizen's suit provision allowing for pre-
enforcement judicial review for claims of irreparable
harm to health and the environment against a final, yet
uncompleted, EPA remedial action plan.
The Gamma-Tech Court found a convenient procedural
route to grant federal jurisdiction under the statute.
The Court reasoned that section 113(h) retains jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts once a section 107 action is
brought for reimbursement of response costs."1 A sec-
tion 107 action "opens the door for alleged responsible
parties to contest their liability as well as to challenge
the EPA's response action as being unnecessarily ex-
pensive or otherwise not in accordance with the appli-
cable law."1 1 2 Specifically, according to the language,
legislative history and case law interpreting the statute,
section 113(h)(1) allows challenges to EPA response ac-
tions once the agency brings an action for response
costs."3 Because Congress allowed the EPA to bring
section 107 actions for response costs prior to the com-
pletion of cleanup, "or as soon as costs have been in-
curred," under section 113(g)(2),114 the question became
109. See id. at 148.
110. See Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 151-52.
111. See id. at 142.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 142-43.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (1994).
tA]ction or actions under section 9607 of this title for
urther response costs . . .may be maintained at any
time during the response action, but must be commenced
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"whether the exception under subsection 9613(h)(1)
would lift the bar to challenges against response actions
even where the EPA brings a cost recovery suit before
cleanup is complete .... 5
The Gamma-Tech Court found that there was nothing
in the plain language of either sections 113(g)(2) or
113(h)(1) to indicate any difference between a challenge
to a completed action or one still in progress."6 The
Court then proceeded to discuss the types of remedies
that are available under the statute. The Third Circuit
found that EPA response actions inconsistent with the
NCP may be challenged in defending a cost recovery ac-
tion under section 107 (a)(4)(A)," 7 and that PRPs, relying
on section 113 (g)(2), may also defend such actions on
the ground that the response action was "arbitrary and
capricious or otherwise not in accordance with the
law.""8 A successful defense on these grounds allows
for the remedies listed at section 1130)(3), which are:
"[Tihe court shall award (A) only the response costs or
damages that are not inconsistent with the [NCP], and
(B) such other relief as is consistent with the [NCP]."" 9
Therefore, the court reasoned, any relief consistent with
the NCP is available to successful section 107 defen-
dants who challenge the EPA's remedial action plan.'20
The Gamma-Tech Court then analyzed the citizen's
suit exception under section 113(h)(4) and the interplay
between that section and the citizen's suit provision un-
no later than 3 years after the date of completion of all
response action. Except as otherwise provided in this
paragraph [having to do with declaratory judgments], an
action may be commenced under section 9607 of this ti-
tle for recovery of costs at any time after such costs have
been incurred.
Id.
115. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 143.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 143-44.
118. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 144.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(3) (1994).
120. See Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 144.
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der section 159. The Court observed that while there
were opinions from different circuits that held that
cleanup should be completed prior to granting review
under the citizen's suit exception, none of these courts
had dealt specifically with bona fide allegations of ir-
reparable harm to the environment as a result of viola-
tions of CERCLA.' 21 The Court also observed that "[iln
circumstances where irreparable environmental damage
will result from a planned response action, forcing par-
ties to wait until the project has been fully completed
before hearing objections to the action would violate the
purpose of CERCLA."
122
The Court's review of the congressional history re-
vealed that members of Congress made conflicting
statements regarding this very issue. '23 After studying
the congressional history, the court ultimately looked to
the reasoning of the Court in Cabot and the statement
of Senator Stafford for practical advice. 124 Senator
Stafford had commented that, "'the courts must draw
appropriate distinctions between dilatory or other un-
authorized lawsuits by [PRPs] involving only monetary
damages and legitimate citizen's suits complaining of
irreparable injury that can be only addressed . . . if a
claim is heard during or prior to a response action.'"
25
It was therefore concluded that "[tihe citizens' suit pro-
vision is effectively nullified if litigation must be delayed
until after irreparable harm or damage has been done.
In such circumstances, a statutory interpretation that
calls for the full completion of the plan before review is
permitted makes the citizens' suit provision an absurd-
ity. " 2
6
121. See id.
122. Id. at 144-45.
123. See id. at 145-46.
124. See id. at 146.
125. Id. at 146 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 28,409 (1986)).
126. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 146.
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The EPA had attempted to rely on Boarhead Corp. v.
Erickson, 2 a Third Circuit case that denied pre-
enforcement review of an uncompleted EPA remedial
cleanup action despite allegations that the cleanup vio-
lated the National Historic Preservation Act.1 28  The
Gamma-Tech Court distinguished Boarhead in that it
was brought by PRPs before the EPA had sought
cleanup costs, and also because the PRPs in Boarhead
did not allege a violation of CERCLA. 129 Because the
EPA in Gamma-Tech was seeking reimbursement for
costs expended in implementing part of the cleanup, the
Court found that the timeliness requirement of section
113(h) was satisfied. In addition, the Court held that
Gamma-Tech was free to challenge not only the com-
pleted phases of the cleanup, but also the part of the
cleanup plan which remained unfinished, for which
costs were incurred and the EPA sought indemnifica-
tion. 13
0
Further, the Gamma-Tech Court found that there was
no language that explicitly excluded injunctive relief as
a remedy in section 1130)(3).3 3 Because permitting the
EPA to continue with a cleanup plan that could irrepa-
rably harm the environment would be inconsistent with
the NCP and contrary to the objectives of CERCLA, the
Court reasoned, "when irreparable harm to public
health or the environment is threatened, an injunction
may be issued under the citizens' suit exception of sub-
section 9613(h)(4) even though the cleanup may not yet
be completed."
1 32
This holding was a departure from the existing case
law that enforced a strict pre-enforcement litigation ban,
making it the subject of much controversy and scholarly
127. 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991).
128. See Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 147.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 147.
132. Id.
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debate over the drawbacks and benefits of such an ap-
proach. 133 While the holding in Gamma-Tech stimulated
ideas and suggestions about changing the existing state
of the citizen's suit exception, the decision's stare deci-
sis influence was short-lived. The Third Circuit ad-
dressed the application of the citizen's suit exception
again, three years later in Clinton County Commissioners
v. Environmental Protection Agency. 
134
2. Clinton County Commissioners v. EPA
In 1997, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, overturned
the holding in Gamma-Tech and resolved the split in the
circuit courts regarding the applicability of the citizen's
suit exception to pre-enforcement review. 135 This deci-
sion ultimately resorted to the same arguments that had
been previously used to prohibit any real use of the citi-
zen's suit exception. Once again, it became clear that
Congress should either rewrite the statute and permit
citizen suits to go forward at the pre-enforcement stage
in cases of irreparable harm to health and the environ-
ment, or write the exception out of the statute for the
sake of judicial economy and statutory coherence. 136
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Clinton County
conducted an independent review of the text of CERCLA
section 113 (h) (4) and its legislative history and case
law. 1 37 The Court concluded that "Congress intended to
preclude all citizens' suits against EPA remedial actions
under CERCLA until such actions are complete, re-
gardless of the harm that the actions might allegedly
cause."138 The Court began by looking to the "plain lan-
guage" of the statute, noting that it is in the past tense.
133. See, e.g., infra note 152.
134. 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 1022-25.
138. Id. at 1022 (emphasis added).
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They reasoned that since the subsection specifically
deals with timing of review, usage of the past tense is a
"clear indication of [Congress'] intention that citizen-
initiated review of EPA removal or remedial actions take
place only after such actions are complete." '139 The
Court went on to say that because the opening sentence
of section 113 (h) prohibits challenges to remedial ac-
tions "selected" under section 104 ("selected" being de-
fined as chosen but not fully implemented), and since
subsection 113(h)(4) allows for review of actions "taken"
under section 104 ("taken" being defined as actions cho-
sen and completed), "the exception is presumably more
narrow than the prohibition," and therefore challenges
under section 113(h)(4) are limited to actions "taken" as
defined by the Court.'4 ° The Court also pointed to the
language in the last sentence of subsection 113(h)(4),
which states, "an action may not be brought with regard
to a removal where a remedial action is to be under-
taken at the site."' 4' They concluded that "[tihis lan-
guage demonstrates beyond peradventure ... that Con-
gress intended to preclude any judicial involvement in
EPA removal and remedial actions until after such ac-
tions are complete.'
42
The court then examined SARA's legislative history,
quoting several congressional conference committee re-
ports on SARA, which generally supported the ban on
citizen suits at the pre-enforcement stage.'43 However,
the Court also noted that the Judiciary Committee had
proposed an amendment to the statute that would have
permitted citizens to "seek review of remedial actions
(not removal actions) during construction and imple-
mentation of such actions when a specific remedial
measure that has been constructed is allegedly in viola-
139. Id. at 1022-23.
140. See Clinton County, 116 F.3d at 1022-23.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (h) (4) (1994).
142. Clinton County, 116 F.3d at 1023.
143. See id. at 1023-24.
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tion of the Act.' 44 The Court believed that "[t]he fact
that Congress did not enact the Judiciary Committee's
proposed amendment demonstrates its commitment to
preventing all judicial interference with remedial ac-
tions."145 However, the fact that this amendment wasn't
passed can be interpreted in another way. The amend-
ment's failure could simply mean that Congress could
not come up with a satisfactory way to implement such
a requirement and still protect cleanups from the dila-
tory tactics of PRPs.
This analysis is in keeping with another of the Court's
footnoted observations. The Third Circuit opined
forcefully that "Congress clearly intended that (allega-
tions of irreparable harm) be communicated directly to
EPA during the pre-remediation public notice and com-
ment period, not expressed in court on the eve of the
commencement of a selected remedy." 46 However, the
Court at the same time acknowledged in a footnote to
this statement that there existed "some support in the
legislative history . . . (for the position that) judicial re-
view of incomplete EPA remedial actions is permitted
whenever a challenge includes bona fide allegations of
irreparable harm to public health and the environ-
ment." 141 After quoting Senator Stafford's remarks to
this effect and citing to the similar concerns of Senator
Mitchell and Representatives Roe and Florio,148 the Third
Circuit dismissed these views, stating with certainty
that "Congress weighed public policy and chose the
elaborate pre-remediation public review and comment
procedures over judicial review." 49
144. Id. at 1024 n.1. See also, H.R. REP. No. 99-
253(111), at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3046.
145. Clinton County, 116 F.3d 1018, 1024 n.1 (3d Cir.
1997).
146. Id. at 1024.
147. Id. at 1024 n.2.
148. See id.
149. Id.
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This, despite the fact that CERCLA still does contain a
citizen's suit exception to pre-enforcement review. If
Congress indeed weighed public policy and decided that
the pre-selection notice and comment period was the
proper venue to address issues pertaining to inadequate
or harmful cleanup procedures, the question remains as
to what purpose does the citizen's suit exception to pre-
enforcement review in CERCLA serve, if the plain lan-
guage of the statute makes such pre-enforcement chal-
lenges impossible.
The ruling in Clinton County represents a decision by
the courts not to engage in judicial legislation by read-
ing into the statute an exception that ought to exist, and
indeed by implication of the existence of such an excep-
tion in the language of the statute arguably does exist,
but at the same time is not provided for by the plain
language of the statute. It is ultimately up to Congress
to pass a workable, enforceable citizen's suit exception
in CERCLA. The next section seeks to identify the rea-
son for the current statutory anomaly, and makes sev-
eral suggestions about how Congress may remedy it. 50
III. REVISING THE CITIZEN'S SUIT PROVISION OF CERCLA TO
MAKE IT WORK
Since the enactment of the SARA amendments to the
present day, Congress and the courts have sought to
150. The Clinton County court also looked to other fed-
eral circuit decisions to support its interpretation that §§
9613(h)(4) and 9659(a)(2) do not permit district courts to ex-
ercise subject matter jurisdiction over citizen suits challeng-
ing uncompleted EPA cleanups even where irreparable harm
to health and the environment is alleged. See Schalk v.
Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1990); Arkansas
Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology,
999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993); Hanford Downwinders Coali-
tion, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); and
Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th
Cir. 1989).
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provide a means whereby citizens could challenge an
EPA selected RAP if the plan could cause irreparable
harm to human health and the environment. While this
is a legitimate and important concern, the problem is
that unscrupulous PRPs would be likely to use any
loophole in the statute themselves, as well as private
citizens as strawmen to act on their behalf to delay
cleanups because of the huge amounts of money in-
volved in effecting them.' There needs to be a satis-
factory way to implement citizen challenges to EPA se-
lected cleanups which may legitimately cause irrepara-
ble harm without creating a loophole in the statute large
enough for PRPs to drive a hazardous waste truck
through. The basic mechanics for the remedial statute
follow.
A. PRPs Should be Able to Bring Pre-Enforcement
Challenges
Professor Lucia Ann Silecchia has written on the sub-
ject of CERCLA's timing of review provision, and has
made several important observations and suggestions
about how to amend CERCLA.'5 2 Her article, written
before the decision by the Third Circuit in Clinton
151. Fears such as these were somewhat sarcastically
illustrated after the Gamma-Tech decision by this observa-
tion: "Attention all PRP's! Now all you have to do in the Third
Circuit to get pre-enforcement review is allege 'irreparable
harm' to the environment. If you establish irreparable harm
to the environment you may be entitled to injunctive relief.
Even if you don't, you can tie the EPA up in prolonged litiga-
tion. Heck, its worth a shot; and it's all in the name of sav-
ing the environmentl" Paul H. McConnell, Note, CERCLA
Wrestling - Grappling With Conflicting Legislative Intent and
the Citizen's Suit Provision - United States v. Princeton
Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994), 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L.
& TECH. J. 115, 115 (1995).
152. See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Judicial Review of
CERCLA Cleanup Procedures: Striking a Balance to Prevent
Irreparable Harm, 20 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 339 (1996).
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County, basically builds on the Third Circuit decision in
Gamma-Tech. 53 While she opposes dropping the bar to
pre-enforcement review completely, Professor Silecchia
suggests that Congress should create an exception to
the bar that would allow plaintiffs to challenge a
cleanup if it poses a threat of irreparable harm to health
and the environment.l' This Note builds upon Professor
Silecchia's suggestion, and modifies it to provide a more
effective way to deter dilatory litigation by imposing
heavy fines and penalties upon those who would abuse
the process, while at the same time keeping judicial re-
view open to those citizens who legitimately allege ir-
reparable harm. This Note also provides some proce-
dural suggestions on how to make such challenges
fairer and more effective.
Professor Silecchia's proposal includes a three-part
solution to the problem of irreparable harm. First, any
question of liability for the cleanup of a site in a citizen's
suit challenge should be treated as a separate inquiry,
to be dealt with after the completion of the cleanup.
Professor Silecchia is correct that the liability issue and
the question of irreparable harm in remedy selection
must be separated out in order for a citizen's suit ex-
ception to work.1 5 1 Of course, under the statutory
scheme proposed by this article, any attempt to disguise
153. See id. at 345 (suggesting how Congress might
amend CERCLA by adopting certain parts of the Gamma-Tech
decisions).
154. See id. at 344.
155. See id. at 383-85. Professor Silecchia states:
To the extent that [PRPs] are wrongfully held responsible,
they should be entitled to appeal the decision and be
reimbursed for the costs they have already incurred.
There can always be the option of financial reimburse-
ment to make a defendant whole after a wrongful deter-
mination of liability. Hence, PRPs contesting their un-
derlying liability should do that explicitly and openly in ajudicial hearing on liability - and not disguise it as a
pre-enforcement review challenge to the merits of the
remedy selected.
Id. at 384.
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a liability challenge as a pre-enforcement review chal-
lenge to the merits of the remedy would be dealt with
severely, and would therefore be unlikely. However, the
separation of liability challenges and challenges alleging
irreparable harm is central to the solution proposed
herein.
Secondly, both PRPs and third party plaintiffs should
be allowed to bring pre-enforcement challenges based
on allegations of irreparable harm. 5 6 Although it would
be desirable to exclude PRPs from making these types of
challenges because of their inherent conflict of interest
of benefiting financially from any procedural delay, it is
possible that a PRP would be the only party financially
able or interested to bring a challenge based upon a le-
gitimate health concern. '57 It is also difficult to make a
distinction between PRPs and third parties, since a third
party can bring a pre-enforcement action under the
control of a PRP. Thus, it would make little sense to
make such a distinction if the statute is to permit pre-
enforcement irreparable harm challenges.
Finally, the article proposes that litigation costs and
attorney's fees should be paid by the losing party of a
pre-enforcement review challenge. This last part is not
sufficient to deter dilatory lawsuits. Since the time
value of money is sure to be factored into any PRP's
strategy in determining whether to attempt a dilatory
challenge, and in some circumstances, the prospect of
protracted litigation and the resultant savings in capital
outlays for cleanup compliance would more than offset
court costs and attorney's fees, it might make financial
sense to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. CERCLA
should be amended to eliminate the incentive for PRPs
with malevolent intent to bring dilatory lawsuits in order
to defray the high costs of Superfund cleanups.
One of the most effective mechanisms the EPA has in
its arsenal to ensure PRP compliance with cleanups is
156. See id. at 387.
157. See id.
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the fines and treble damages system for non-compliance
with EPA cleanup orders under CERCLA section
106(a).158 If this mechanism was applied to frivolous
challenges to cleanups brought under the citizen's suit
exception under CERCLA subsection 113(h)(4), there
would be a workable pre-enforcement review method for
bona fide challenges alleging irreparable harm to health
and the environment. Congress could rewrite subsec-
tion 113(h)(4) to allow pre-enforcement challenges al-
leging irreparable harm to go forward in federal court,
and if the challenge is found to be frivolous, the court
will determine that the challenge had initiated a cleanup
order under section 106(a) on the date the challenge
was filed, triggering fines and treble damages for non-
compliance with this retroactive order. Under such a
system, the citizen Suit exception to pre-enforcement
review would become relevant, and future instances of
irreparable harm under EPA selected plans could be
avoided without providing an attractive tool for PRPs to
use to delay cleanups through tactical litigation.
Any challenge brought under the new statutory
scheme, for reasons of dispatch, should provide for a
hearing to determine the merits of the claim within
ninety days of the filing of the action. The EPA's se-
lected plan would be given all the deference accorded to
administrative agency defendants under the arbitrary
and capricious standard of judicial review.'59 The court
should then apply a two-prong analysis in determining
158. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994).
159. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1996). "To the extent nec-
essary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The court
shall... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law .... " Id.
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whether the challenge should be granted. First, the
challenging party should bear the burden of showing
that the EPA's selected RAP would cause irreparable
harm; it is not enough to merely allege that an EPA se-
lected remedy will cause irreparable harm. The second
prong of the court's analysis is that the challenger
should be required to present to the court a viable al-
ternative plan that would reduce the amount of irrepa-
rable harm to the environment. The second prong is
essential because even though the EPA's selected rem-
edy may cause irreparable harm, postponement of the
cleanup might cause even more.16 ° Any alternative plan
would already have been significantly developed by the
time the notice and comment period had elapsed, since
any concerned parties would have had the opportunity
to present any such alternatives at this stage of the pro-
ceedings. 161 If the challenging party claims in good faith
to have a viable alternative plan, meeting NCP stan-
dards, which will clean up the site and at the same time
spare the alleged irreparable damage risked by the
EPA's plan, the complaint should be heard and adjudi-
cated by the federal district court. If such a plan has
not been developed and presented by the challenging
party, the challenge should not be allowed to go for-
ward, and fines and damages should be imposed.
Under this proposal, if the EPA is challenged in federal
court as to the health and environmental ramifications
of its final cleanup plan, it will receive deference to its
decision unless it can be shown that the plan violates
160. See Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1978.
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k) (1994) (providing for pub-
lic participation in assembling the administrative record on
which the selection of the remedy and any judicial review will
be based); 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1994) (permitting public partici-
pation in proposed and final remedial action plans and pro-
viding for publication of the same); 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2)
(1994) (detailing public participation in proposed settlement
agreements).
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the NCP in a way that will cause irreparable harm.
Once again, it is not enough to show that the EPA's plan
would cause irreparable harm; the challenging party
must come up with a substantially safer plan that falls
within the guidelines of the NCP. The second part of the
court's analysis would therefore necessarily involve a
comparative evaluation of both the EPA's plan and the
challenging party's plan. Each plan would foreseeably
be defended by scientific experts on either side of the
argument. In defending their respective positions on
the merits of the competing plans, these experts should
be subject to cross-examination. Such a system would
create a further incentive for the EPA to be more open to
compromise with PRPs, and to perform more efficiently
and within the requirements of the NCP. Because
cross-examination will serve to act as a check on Agency
behavior, the EPA will be forced to improve the quality
of its participation and engage in more reasoned deci-
sion-making in the remedy selection process. Addition-
ally, this should help judges in evaluating the adminis-
trative record for determinations of EPA action as to
whether such action is arbitrary, capricious, or other-
wise not in accordance with the law. 162
While it is true that determinations of whether one
cleanup plan should be preferred over another is a deci-
sion involving highly technical evaluations, this fact
should not in itself preclude the participation of the ju-
diciary in rendering a decision as to which plan is likely
to produce significantly less harm. Judge David L.
Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in a concurring opinion involving
162. For a similar discussion about the effects of cross-
examination on the remedy selection process at the post-
cleanup liability determination stage, see Kristin M. Carter,
Note, Superfund Amendments And Reauthorization Act of
1986: Limiting Judicial Review To The Administrative Record
in Cost Recovery Actions By The EPA, 74 CORNELL L. REv.
1152, 1175-78, (1989).
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an early version of the Clean Air Act,163 had this to say
about the necessity of cross-examination in complex
technical issues:
[EInvironmental litigation represents a "new era" in
administrative law.... [Tihe courts will go further in
requiring the agency to establish a decision-making
process adequate to protect the interests of all 'con-
sumers' of the natural environment .... Whether or
not traditional administrative rules require it, the
critical character of [these] decision[s] requires at the
least a carefully limited right of cross examination at
the hearing and an opportunity to challenge the as-
sumptions and methodology underlying the decision
.... These complex questions should be resolved in
the crucible of debate through the clash of informed
but opposing scientific and technological viewpoints.
164
As technology grows, so does the level of complexity in
many areas of the law from DNA analysis to intellectual
property rights. Judges will therefore be called upon to
render more and more decisions involving complex
technical matters. It is difficult to imagine an instance
where the intervention of the judiciary is more appropri-
ate than one in which a federal agency charged with
protecting the environment may, through its action,
needlessly cause irreparable harm to the environment.
Under the proposed statutory scheme, unnecessary
complex judicial determinations should be rare, because
the harsh penalties involved for those who would seek to
163. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 651-52. Although Judge Bazelon reached a
different conclusion as to the judiciary's capacity to render
technical decisions in this area (Judge Bazelon thought that
cross-examination should be used in the agency's pre-
decision stage in order to produce a more complete record,
thereby holding the agency's decision up to scrutiny by the
public, Congress, and the scientific community), his reason-
ing is sound. See id.
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bring frivolous suits in order to delay cleanups should
deter such behavior.
The questions of liability and the possibility of irrepa-
rable harm are clearly distinguished within the pro-
posed solution. A party challenging a cleanup based on
the issue of liability would not have access to the courts
at the pre-enforcement stage. If such a challenge was
attempted under the guise of alleging irreparable harm,
the court would impose heavy penalties. Given the
harsh penalties, it is unlikely that a party would at-
tempt to challenge liability by alleging irreparable harm.
The EPA's selected plan would be given all the defer-
ence accorded to administrative agency defendants un-
der the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial
review.'65 Under the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review, a challenge brought by a citizen against an
EPA selected remedy must show that the EPA's decision
was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. 166 If a chal-
lenger is able to present an alternative plan that shows
that the EPA's plan unnecessarily jeopardized public
health and the environment, it is safe to say that the
EPA's decision on the final plan would have been at the
very least arbitrary, if not an abuse of discretion, and
certainly not in accordance with the NCP.
165. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1996).
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms
of an agency action. The reviewing court shall . . . hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and con-
clusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law
Id.
166. See id.
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B. The Benefits of This Plan
A citizens' suit provision that actually allows citizens
to challenge potentially harmful cleanups would be
beneficial. One benefit would be increased cooperation
between PRPs, concerned citizens and the EPA in the
notice and comment phase of the remedial action plan,
in order to avoid unnecessary use of the citizens' suit
provision.1 67  PRPs and concerned citizens would be
more cooperative because they would face harsh penal-
ties if the court denies their challenge. Additionally the
EPA would be more responsive since they will be judi-
cially accountable prior to the end of the cleanup. An-
other benefit is that citizens would have the right to
seek redress from the federal courts in these situations.
This solution would make the pre-selection phase of the
process more efficient, without jeopardizing the EPA's
authority to select, at its discretion, reasonable cleanup
plans. It would be in the interest of all parties involved
to avoid a citizen's suit.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the legislative history of CERCLA,
the case commentary interpreting CERCLA and an over-
ruled Third Circuit decision, 168 that Congress and the
courts have sought for a way to provide a citizen's suit
exception to pre-enforcement review of EPA selected re-
medial action. Congress and the courts want citizens to
make good faith challenges to EPA cleanup plans that
will cause irreparable harm to health and the environ-
ment. This has proved difficult to do under the current
statutory scheme. One solution is to require all chal-
lengers to prove that the EPA's plan will cause irrepara-
ble damage and to present a viable alternative plan con-
167. See Silecchia, supra note 64, at 382-83.
168. See United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.,
31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994).
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sistent with EPA standards and the NCP. If the chal-
lenger fails to do so, the court should impose fines and
treble damages applying retroactively to the time of the
challenge. This would be an effective method of bal-
ancing the need for citizen challenges to possible irre-
versible environmental damage caused by the EPA's fi-
nal plan, with the risks (and costs) of delaying cleanups.
It is up to Congress, and not the courts, to provide citi-
zens with the ability to challenge EPA selected remedial
actions. As long as the plain language of CERCLA
makes the citizen's suit exception ineffective, the courts
will not be able to provide an effective solution.

